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CHALLENGES: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED*
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I. INTRODUCTION
One might be cynical about the usefulness of trying to draw legal
guidance from a judicial determination of a United States-Canada dispute
admitted by the judges themselves to be geographically unique. As
stated by the majority of the judges in the Case Concerning Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine
Case) decision:
Although the practice is still rather sparse, owing to the relative
newness of the question, it too is there to demonstrate that each
specific case is, in the final analysis, different from all the others,
that it is monotypic and that, more often than not, the most
appropriate criteria, and the method or combination of methods
most likely to yield a result consonant with what the law
indicates, can only be determined in relation to each particular
case and its specific characteristics.1

* This paper is substantially drawn from David VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine
Boundary Dispute and Transboundary Management Challenges: Lessons for the
Aegean? in THE AEGEAN SEA AFTER THE COLD WAR: SECURITY AND LAW
OF THE SEA ISSUES 118-133 (Aldo Chircop, A. Gerolymatos & J.O. Iatrides eds.,
New York: St. Martins’ Press 2000) (reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan)
and a subsequent presentation at the 2008 International Conference on Boundary
Delimitation in Taipei on June 19, 2008. The author would like to acknowledge the
support of the Center for Marine Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University in
updating the original publication.
** Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University and
Canada Research Chair in Ocean Law and Governance.
1. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, 290 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Judgment].
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However, this Article, after providing a brief historical overview of
the Gulf of Maine dispute, suggests six general lessons to be extracted
from the Gulf of Maine Case. Those lessons include: the utility of
binding dispute resolution and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Chamber procedure; the flexibility in establishing the parameters for
binding dispute resolution; the possible linkability of a binding dispute
resolution agreement with other marine management and entitlement
issues; the possible variability of maritime boundary claims over time;
the divisibility of the line drawing task; and the advisability of pursuing
the binding dispute resolution alternative.
Two additional lessons have emerged in the wake of the case. First
is the continuity of transboundary ocean and coastal governance
challenges, even after an ocean boundary is drawn. Second is the
evolutionary nature of maritime boundary methodology where
subsequent cases have further clarified the rather murky delimitation
approach set out in the Gulf of Maine Case.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE GULF OF MAINE DISPUTE
Surrounded by the states of Maine, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts, and the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, the Gulf of Maine, located off the northeast coast of the United
States, began to become an offshore “turf battle” in the 1960s and early
1970s because of varying continental shelf claims. In 1964 Canada
issued oil and gas exploration permits on Georges Bank,2 the thumbshaped underwater plateau rich in fisheries resources.3 Relying on the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,4 Canada considered
the equidistant line as the proper ocean boundary.5 While the United
States also began to issue geophysical exploration permits on Georges
Bank in 1964,6 the United States did not formally protest the Canadian

2. Id. at 279.
3. For a review of abundance of market and non-market species on Georges Bank,
see Edward B. Cohen & Richard W. Langton, The Ecological Consequences of Fishing
in the Gulf of Maine, in THE GULF OF MAINE, NOAA COASTAL OCEAN PROGRAM
REGIONAL SYNTHESIS SERIES 45, 58-60 (David W. Townsend and Peter F. Larsen eds.,
Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1992).
4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
5. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 279.
6. Memorial submitted by the United States of America in Case Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 58 (Sept. 27, 1982).
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claim until November 1969,7 when the United States requested a
moratorium until the exact continental shelf boundary could be agreed
upon. On December 1, 1969, Canada refused to accept a moratorium,8
and during subsequent negotiations in 1970, the United States first made
its boundary position clear. All of Georges Bank was claimed, with the
deep Northeast Channel, off the tip of the Bank, viewed as a natural
dividing line.9
A “fish feud” emerged in light of the adoption of 200 nautical mile
fishing zones in 1977 by both the United States and Canada.10 With
Canada’s fisheries zone becoming effective on January 1, 1977, and the
United States’ fisheries zone coming into force on March 1, 1977, overlapping fisheries zones occurred.11 Canada at first claimed an equidistant
line, but on November 3, 1977 it enlarged its claim. The claim changed
due to the special circumstances of Cape Cod, Nantucket Island, and
Martha’s Vineyard, which, Canada argued, should not be considered part
of the United States coastline due to their distorting effect.12 The United
States claimed all the fisheries of Georges Bank.13 Through interim
arrangements, the countries agreed to allow fishing to continue by
nationals of both sides in the disputed areas subject to flag state
enforcement and in accord with pre-existing fishing patterns and
efforts.14
Following negotiations in 1977-1978, the feud appeared to be nearly
over in March 1979. A package of two linked treaties, one attempting to
ensure a permanent fisheries access and management regime in the
transboundary region, regardless of the eventual boundary line,15 and a
second agreeing to send the dispute to binding resolution by a Chamber

7. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 280-81.
8. Id. at 281.
9. Id.
10. For a review of the history see David L. VanderZwaag, THE FISH FEUD: THE US
AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE (Lexington: Lexington Books 1983).
11. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 282-83.
12. Id. at 284.
13. Id.
14. Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada, U.S-Can., Feb. 24, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5571; Gulf
of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 283.
15. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources, U.S.-Can., March 29, 1979,
reprinted in Annexes to the Memorial submitted by Canada, Vol. 1, Annex 20,
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) (Sept.
1982) [hereinafter East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement].
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of the International Court of Justice,16 were concluded on March 29,
1979.
Because of substantial opposition from U.S. fishing interests and
industry representatives to the 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement,17
only a delinked boundary settlement treaty was ratified by the United
States. Canada and the United States exchanged instruments of
ratification of the amended boundary settlement treaty on November 20,
1981 and notification to the International Court of Justice of a reference
was given on November 25, 1981.18
On October 12, 1984 a Chamber of the International Court of Justice
drew a single maritime boundary for the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank
region. Canada received jurisdiction over approximately one-sixth of
Georges Bank,19 and some commentators have described the decision as
essentially “splitting the difference” between the Canadian and United
States’ claims.20
III. SIX LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CASE
A. The Utility of Binding Third-Party Resolutions and the ICJ Chamber
Procedure
While a negotiated settlement of an ocean boundary dispute is generally preferable to international litigation for cost, creativity, and control
reasons, the United States-Canada Gulf of Maine dispute shows the
useful “final say” function of third-party binding dispute resolution.
After over a decade of negotiations, the two states were still unable to
resolve the maritime boundary and management disputes through
negotiation, and politicians, bureaucrats, and lawyers found themselves
stalemated.21 With so many socioeconomic interests at stake, including
those of the United States fishing industry, who saw Georges Bank as
“belonging to America,”22 both countries saw the need for an
16. The Agreement is reproduced in Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 252-55.
17. For a review of some of the grounds for opposition, including a belief that the
scallop allotment was inequitable to the United States, see VanderZwaag, supra note 10,
at 90-92.
18. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 287.
19. Jan Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79
AM. J. INT’L L. 539 (1985).
20. Id. at 541.
21. See Lewis Alexander, The Gulf of Maine Case: An International Discussion, 21
STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 71 (1988) (statement of Davis Robinson).
22. VanderZwaag, supra note 10, at 91-92.
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authoritative decision by a prestigious institution to which local
constituencies would listen.23 Conciliation was viewed as unworkable
because general words of guidance would likely not be accepted by
vested interest groups.24
The Gulf of Maine dispute also highlights the possible attractiveness
of sending a boundary dispute to a Chamber of the ICJ rather than to the
full 15-member Court or to an independent ad hoc arbitral tribunal.25
Through the Chamber procedure, both countries were able to select five
judges26 with experience in the area and who posed no major political
sensitivities.27 The Chamber was chosen over an international arbitration
because the parties saw numerous benefits of an established institution
where judges’ salaries, courtrooms, registry, translation, interpretation,
and reproduction were independently provided and funded.28
B. Flexibility in Establishing the Parameters for Binding Dispute
Resolution
The Gulf of Maine Case shows that parties choosing to go to binding
dispute settlement have considerable flexibility in directing what is to be
settled and how. Parties have leeway in requesting partial versus full settlement of boundary disputes, asking a tribunal to actually draw a
boundary line versus declaring general legal guidance, and opting for a
single line versus multiple lines.
1. Partial vs. Full Settlement
The Gulf of Maine dispute demonstrates how parties may withhold
some parts of a boundary conflict from binding resolution in favor of
pursuing direct negotiation or further settlement at a later date. Canada
23. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 16-17 (statement of Leonard LeGault).
24. Id. at 20.
25. For a good discussion of the perceived benefits, see Davis R. Robinson, David A.
Colson & Bruce C. Rashkaw, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating before the World
Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 581-82 (1985).
26. The judges appointed by the Court as requested by the parties included: Roberto
Ago (Italy), Herman Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Andre Gros (France),
Stephen Schwebel (United States), and Maxwell Cohen as judge ad hoc (Canada). Id. at
582.
27. For example, a United States’ representative expressed concern over how the U.S.
systems would have reacted if a Soviet judge had some bearing on determining the fate of
New England fisherpersons. See Alexander, supra note 21 at 17-18 (statement of David
Colson).
28. Robinson et al., supra note 25, at 581.
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and the United States reserved from judicial delimitation a section of
approximately thirty-nine miles, the boundary area nearest the coasts.29
Because of sovereignty disputes over Machias Seal Island and North
Rock,30 the parties chose to ask the Court to begin its delineation exercise
at the agreed point seaward of the disputed lands.31 The parties also did
not wish to have the Court determine a boundary line out to the edge of
the continental margin, and therefore restricted it to terminating the
boundary in a triangle drawn seaward of Georges Bank32 (see Fig. 1). In
the Special Agreement to resort to adjudication before a Chamber of the
World Court, the parties agreed that after the decision, either party could
request negotiations on a seaward extension of the maritime boundary. If
no agreement was forthcoming, either party could require binding thirdparty settlement.33

29. Id. at 584-85.
30. For a further review of the dispute, see Sue Nichols, The Gulf of Maine Boundary:
Reviewing the Issues, 4-6, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Fredericton: Cadastral Studies,
1982); Beverly Cook, Lobster Boat Diplomacy: the Canada-US Grey Zone 29 MARINE
POLICY 385, 385-90; Ted L. McDorman & David L. VanderZwaag, American-Canadian
Boundary Dispute, and Cooperation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Max Planck Institute for comparative public law and international
law: heidelberg and oxford university press 2010), available at http://www.mpepil.com.
31. Termed point A, the location is the first point of intersection of the two lines
representing the limits of the fishing zones respectively claimed by Canada and the
United States. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 265 (Oct. 12).
32. Id. at 266.
33. Article VII of the Special Agreement of 29 March 1979. The Agreement is
reprinted in the Gulf of Maine Judgment. Id. at 252-55.
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Figure 1: general map of the Gulf of Maine region, showing the
starting-point for the delimitation line and the area for its
termination.34
2. Actual Line vs. General Guidance
The Gulf of Maine Case emphasizes the choice parties have to ask a
tribunal to actually draw a boundary line or to simply declare relevant
principles, rules, and methods for future demarcation guidance. While in
the two previous cases before the ICJ involving maritime boundary
delimitations parties had requested only judicial guidance,35 Canada and
the United States asked the Chamber to draw a delimitation line itself.36
34. Id. at 269.
35. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Jan. 20).
36. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 267.
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The Gulf of Maine Case portrays the difficult trade-off which states
may face in making the choice between actual line and general guidance.
States wishing to retain control over negotiating a final boundary
alignment by requesting merely a “declaratory” judgment may risk
further dispute in the subsequent demarcation negotiations.37 Because
Canada and the United States wished to resolve the boundary issue “once
and for all,” and to avoid further negotiations, they chose to request an
actual delimitation.38
3. Single Line vs. Multiple Lines
The Gulf of Maine Case also demonstrates the flexibility countries
encounter in whether to request a tribunal to delimit a single maritime
boundary or to allow judicial discretion for the drawing of separate
continental shelf and water column lines. The case also shows why most
countries would probably prefer a single boundary. Canada and the
United States asked the ICJ Chamber to draw a single maritime
boundary, as the parties wished to avoid the potential “managerial
nightmare” resulting from separate fisheries and seabed lines. For
example, if Canada were granted seabed jurisdiction but no fisheries
jurisdiction over Georges Bank, it might be tempted to proceed with
hydrocarbon exploration without concern for U.S. fishing interests.39
While the Chamber accepted the legal feasibility of drawing a single
line,40 it also noted the legal implications of a single-line request. A
single-line delimitation was viewed as forcing a tribunal to give
preference to “neutral” geographical criteria, such as equal division of
areas off converging and overlapping coastal projections, length of
coastlines, and the effect of offshore islands.41 Criteria for division
exclusively based on only one of the natural realities to be delimited,
such as natural separation of ecosystems or a distinct geological feature
on the continental shelf, are ruled out.42
37. Interestingly, in the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between
Greenland and Jan Mayen, where Denmark desired a delimitation line while Norway
wished to have a declaration, the ICJ proceeded to draw a line in order to completely
“discharge [ ] its duty to determine the dispute.” Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation
in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den, v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 78 (June
14).
38. Alexander, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of David Colson).
39. Id. at 27-28.
40. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 267.
41. Id. at 327-28.
42. Id. at 326-27.
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While the United States argued that the Northeast Channel,
sometimes over 200 meters deep, represented a natural boundary,43 the
Court rejected the argument on two main grounds. First, the seabed itself
did not show major geological divisions.44 For example, sand, mud,
gravel, and underlying hydrocarbon deposits ran across from the
Second, the
Canadian Scotian Shelf to Georges Bank.45
“geomorphological accident” of the Northeast Channel did not divide the
marine resources and ecosystems of the adjacent water column.46
The Gulf of Maine Case thus suggests a practical question for countries pondering third party boundary adjudication in the future. Is the
possible wider scope for arguing ecological and geological criteria in a
multiple-line request worth the ocean management complexities which
would be likely to accompany a plurality of lines?
C. Linkability of a Binding Dispute Resolution
The Gulf of Maine Case also highlights the possibility for parties
engaged in a maritime boundary dispute to make an agreement to litigate
conditional on the settlement of at least some closely linked issues.
Canada and the United States at first agreed to link the Treaty to Submit
to Binding Dispute Resolution with the Agreement on East Coast Fishery
Resources, where both would have to be ratified before either came into
effect.47 The East Coast Fisheries Agreement48 (the Agreement) promised
to establish a joint fisheries management commission and to ensure
fisheries access to both countries for certain fish stocks, regardless of
where a boundary might eventually be drawn. The Agreement also
provided an “insurance policy” to Canada in particular, which faced the
possibility of losing all of Georges Bank through judicial recourse.49
When political opposition in the United States to the Fisheries
Agreement made acceptance impossible, Canada only agreed to ratify the
Boundary Settlement Treaty upon assurances that the United States
would refrain from enforcement activities against Canadian fishing
43. Id. at 276.
44. Id. at 275.
45. See Gulf of Maine Case, Annexes to the Canadian Memorial Submitted by
Canada, Vol. I, 1-22.
46. Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 277.
47. Id. at 287.
48. East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement, supra note 15.
49. For reviews of the complex and detailed fishery management arrangements
negotiated, see VanderZwaag, supra note 10; Memorial submitted by Canada in the Gulf
of Maine case (Sept. 1982), 111-14.
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vessels in all areas claimed by Canada pending the conclusion of
adjudication.50
D. Variability of Maritime Boundary Claims Over Time
The Gulf of Maine Case also shows how national claims can vary
during negotiations and even within adjudication. While Canada at first
claimed an equidistant line on Georges Bank in 1977, amid negotiations
to resolve the dispute, Canada expanded its claims through an argument
of “equitable equidistance” whereby Cape Cod would be disregarded in
determining the equidistant line and an additional 2900 square miles
would be gained.51 While the United States initially claimed a line
through the Northeast Channel generally following the deepest water, the
United States added to the claim in 1982 at the memorial stage before the
Court. An adjusted perpendicular line to the general direction of the
coast of Maine was argued52 (see Figure 2). The United States, in
shifting the line to within some twenty-five nautical miles of Yarmouth,
Nova Scotia, was trying to take a position of maximum legal advantage.53

50.
51.
52.
53.

Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 287.
Robinson et al., supra note 25, at 591.
Id.
Alexander, supra note 21, at 47 (statement by Davis Robinson).
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Figure 2: Claims of the Parties in the Gulf of Maine Case.54

54. Reproduced from Jan Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an
Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 539, 547 (1985).

252

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

E. The Divisibility of the Line-drawing Task
The Gulf of Maine Case highlights a “division by segments”
approach to boundary-making which is likely to be common given the
varying geographical circumstances arising in many boundary conflicts.
The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case chose to draw a boundary line in
three segments to reflect the changing geographical relationships
between the United States and Canada as one moves seaward from the
delimitation starting point chosen by the parties. The first segment
reflected the lateral adjacency relationship of the countries at the back of
the Gulf.55 The second segment, reflecting the oppositeness of coastlines, was a median line corrected to account for the longer American
coastline (284 miles to 206 miles or a 1.38 to 1 ratio), and to give half
effect to the presence of Seal Island and a smaller island (Mud Island)
located some thirteen miles off the mainland of Nova Scotia.56 The third
segment was drawn into the open ocean as a perpendicular line to the
closing line of the Gulf with a termination at the last point of overlap
between the parties’ 200 nautical-mile fishing zone claims.57 (see Figure
3).

55. Donat Pharand, Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: Continental Shelf and
Exclusive Economic Zone, in Light of the Gulf of Maine Case, Canada v. United States
(1984), 16 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 363, 381 (1985).
56. Id. at 381-82.
57. Id. at 382.
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Figure 3: Delimitation Line Drawn by the Court.58

58. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, 346 (Oct. 12).
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F. The Advisability of Pursuing the Binding Dispute Resolution
Alternative
The Gulf of Maine Case stands as a caution to countries considering
binding dispute resolution as the legal “reductionism” likely to be faced.
While the Gulf of Maine dispute was primarily about fisheries access and
historical fisheries dependencies, the Court downplayed examination of
socioeconomic and historical factors. The Court put on “blinders” and
reduced criteria for application to the delimitation process itself to
geographical ones. The main criterion is equal division of areas where
the maritime projections of the coasts of the states converge and
overlap.59 Auxiliary criteria, applied as corrective measures, are giving
effect to the difference between the lengths of the respective coastlines
(proportionality) and to the presence of islands.60 While not eligible to
be used as official criteria in the delimitation process, human and
economic geography may be relevant to help ascertain whether an
equitable result was achieved.61 Socioeconomic aspects would only be
given weight in case of radical inequitability involving “catastrophic
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the
population of the countries concerned.”62
The Gulf of Maine Case also raises the question of whether parties
should be willing to risk litigation when even the concept of “neutral
geography” is laden with subjectivity and discretion. An example of the
wide scope for geographical interpretation was shown by differing judicial views in the case over relevant Bay of Fundy coastal lengths in calculating proportionality. While the majority was willing to include
coasts up to the point where the Bay narrows to contain “only maritime
areas lying no further than 12 miles from the low water mark,”63 Judge
Schwebel in a separate opinion would only include the New Brunswick
coast actually fronting on the Gulf of Maine, and the length of a closing
line running across the Bay to Nova Scotia.64 Judge Schwebel noted that
it “is to be expected that differences of judgment on the application of
equitable principles will arise which at times may not admit of confident
conclusions of law.”65
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 327-28. See also Pharand, supra note 55, at 380.
Gulf of Maine Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at 340.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 355 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion).
Id. at 357.
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Judge Gros, in dissent, lamented over the lack of legal certainty represented by the use of equitable principles to reach an equitable result
approach to boundary delimitation:
It is, in short, a law unto itself, where each case is exposed to the
application of any imaginable criteria, methods and corrections
conducive to a result which the disappearance of rules leaves to
the discretion of each tribunal.66
In light of the vagaries of adjudication, various commentators have
questioned the advisability of binding dispute resolution. The model of
the Torres Strait Agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea67
has been invoked as exemplifying the more creative solutions available
through direct negotiations.68 There the parties were able to deal
creatively with a complicated political geography involving Australian
islands near the coast of Papua New Guinea through various innovations.
The innovations included restricting the Australian islands to three-mile
territorial seas; using multiple boundary lines with Australia receiving a
fisheries zone extending seaward from the Australian islands near the
PNG coast, while Papua New Guinea was granted rights to the seabed
beneath the extended fisheries zone; and the establishment of a protected
zone to protect traditional harvesting rights.69
IV. TWO ADDITIONAL LESSONS EMERGING IN THE WAKE OF THE GULF
OF MAINE CASE
A. The Continuity of Transboundary Ocean and Coastal Governance
Challenges
The Gulf of Maine Case demonstrates that a maritime boundary
delimitation is not an endpoint but a starting point for longer-term

66. Id. at 385 (Gros, J., dissenting).
67. The text is reprinted in Australia-Papua New Guinea: Treaty on Sovereignty and
Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Countries, December 18, 1978, 18 I.L.M.
291-331 (1979).
68. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of the Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones: The
Boundary Between Turkey and Greece, in THE AEGEAN ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 263 (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute 1989).
69. For overviews of the treaty provisions, see H. Burmester, The Torres Strait
Treaty: Ocean Boundary Delimitation by Agreement, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 321 (1982);
STUART KAYE, AUSTRALIA’S MARITIME BOUNDARIES 101 (Centre for Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong ed. 1995).
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cooperation in managing the marine environment.70 Various issues
beyond drawing lines at sea remain to be addressed, including: whether
to grant foreign fishing access regardless of a line; allocation and
management measures for transboundary fish stocks; surveillance and
enforcement over illegal fishing; harmonization of standards for marine
and coastal pollution; environmental impact assessment arrangements for
proposed projects threatening to cause significant adverse transboundary
impacts; safety of navigation; protecting habitats of threatened or
endangered species; and promoting sustainable development in coastal
communities.
The Gulf of Maine Case provides an example of how even “good
neighbours” with a “good fence” may still have many “miles to go” in
meeting marine management challenges of a shared sea. Nearly twenty
five years after the ICJ Chamber drew a line across Georges Bank,
Canada and the United States have yet to develop comprehensive
transboundary management arrangements for the Georges Bank and Gulf
of Maine region, and a fragmented array of cooperative arrangements,
mostly informal, have evolved.71 In September 1990, Canada and the
United States, concerned over the growing number of fishers illegally
crossing the boundary line to fish, signed a reciprocal Fisheries
Enforcement Agreement.72 The Agreement obliged each country to
enact domestic prohibitions making it illegal for its nationals to violate
the fisheries laws and regulations of the other state while within the
jurisdiction of that country,73 and penalties for fishers illegally fishing
across the maritime boundary have been harmonized.74
Bilateral fisheries management has largely followed an informal
path. The Canada-USA Transboundary Steering Committee, established
70. See Ted L. McDorman, Phillip M. Saunders & David L. VanderZwaag, The Gulf
of Maine Boundary: Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course?, 9 MARINE POLICY 90
(1985).
71. See ACZISC SECRETARIAT AND MARINE & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE OF
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT GOVERNANCE IN THE BAY OF
FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE: TRANSBOUNDARY COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND
INITIATIVES, OCEANS AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 2006-05 (Fisheries and
Oceans Canada 2006); TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL
OCEAN LAW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 148-155 (New York:
Oxford University Press 2009).
72. Canada-United States: Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement, September 26, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 419.
73. Id. at 419.
74. See Emily J. Pudden & David L. VanderZwaag, Canada-USA Bilateral Fisheries
Management in the Gulf of Maine: Under the Radar Screen, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 36, 40 (2007).
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in 1995 and co-chaired by the Director-General for the Maritimes
Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada) and the Northeast
Regional Administrator of the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service,
serves as the overall consultative and oversight forum for discussing
transboundary resource management issues.75 Under the auspices of the
Steering Committee, the Transboundary Assessment Committee (TRAC)
was established in 1998 to evaluate the status of three shared groundfish
stocks on eastern Georges Bank (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder)
and to provide annual stock assessments.76 In 2000, the Transboundary
Management Guidance Committee (TMGC) was formed to recommend
harvest strategies and develop a resource sharing formula for the three
transboundary groundfish stocks.77 The TMGC subsequently developed
a Resource Sharing Formula which, taking effect in 2003, provided for a
way to allocate annual quotas between the Canada and the United States
for groundfish stocks.
The TMGC Sharing Formula allocates
percentages of harvest based upon historical fisheries landings (for the
period 1967-1994) and fisheries resource distribution with the two
weightings shifting over a seven-year period. The sharing formula
initially assigned a weighting of 60% to resource distribution and 40% to
historic landings for the year 2003, transitioning to a weighting of 90%
for resource distribution and 10% for historical landings by 2010.78
The Canada-USA Transboundary Steering Committee has been
attempting to broaden its overall focus on transboundary fisheries to
more of an ecosystem approach. Working Groups on Species at Risk,
Fish Habitat, and Oceans Management have been formed, and an

75. Id. at 37. The Committee is also sometimes referred to as the U.S./Canada
Transboundary Steering Committee and even as the U.S./Canada Transboundary
Resource Management Steering Committee. See Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO),
History
of
the
Bilateral
Steering
Committee,
http://www.mar.dfompo.gc.ca/science/SC/SC(2)-e.html (last visited June 15, 2010).
76. Id. TRAC assessments have subsequently been undertaken for herring, mackerel
and spiny dogfish as well. Personal Communication, Stratis Gavaris, St. Andrews
Biological Station, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, March 9, 2010.
77. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Transboundary Management Guidance Committee
Guidance Document 2007/01 (Sept. 2007).
78. Transboundary Management Guidance Committee [TMGC], Development of a
Sharing Allocation Proposal for Transboundary Resources of Cod, Haddock and
Yellowtail Flounder on Georges Bank, Fisheries Management Regional Report 2002/01,
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Maritimes Region (Jan. 2002); Pudden & VanderZwaag,
supra note 74, at 38-39.
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Integration Committee oversees and coordinates the activities occurring
under the umbrella of the Canada-USA Steering Committee.79
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment (the
Council) was established in 1989 by the governors of Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Maine and the premiers of New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia, as a forum for fostering cross-border discussions and
collaborations.
The Council, involving representatives of state,
provincial, and federal agencies as well as non-governmental
organizations and the private sector, is administered through a
Secretariat that rotates annually among the five Gulf jurisdictions. The
Council has set goals, outcomes and activities through five-year Action
Plans with the most recent covering 2007-2012.80 Implementation of
the Action Plan is facilitated through projects and initiatives developed
under the auspices of five committees (Habitat, Contaminants,
Maritime Activities, Ecosystem Indicator Partnership, and the Climate
Change Network).
To date cooperative activities have involved mostly talk and studies
with little management action other than in the area of fisheries.
Harmonization of environmental standards and the establishment of a
regional network of marine protected areas remain challenges.81
B. The Evolutionary Nature of Maritime Boundary Methodology
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber highlighted the still rather
nascent and unconsolidated nature of international law and practice
relating to maritime boundary delimitation,82 and summarized the general
and rather vague reality in terms of a “fundamental norm”:

79. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 74, at 43. For a further review of
cooperative arrangements, see Emily J. Pudden & David L. VanderZwaag, CanadaUnited States Bilateral Fisheries Management in the Gulf of Maine: Struggling Towards
Sustainability Under the Radar Screen, in RECASTING TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN LIGHT OF SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES: CANADIAN AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (D.A. Russell and David L. VanderZwaag eds., The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming).
80. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment Action Plan 2007-2012,
http://www.gulfofmaine.org/actionplan (last visited June 15, 2010).
81. For a review of activities pursuant to the agreement, see Aldo Chircop, David
VanderZwaag & Peter Mushat, The Gulf of Maine Agreement and Action Plan: A Novel
But Nascent Approach to Transboundary Marine Environmental Protection 19 MARINE
POLICY 317 (1995).
82. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, 299 (Oct. 12).
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(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those
States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by
means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in
good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a
positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a
third party possessing necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the
application of equitable criteria and by the use of practical
methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic
configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances,
an equitable result.83
More recent international cases have crystallized a quite consistent
methodology. After identifying the relevant area, tribunals have first
provisionally drawn an equidistant line and then considered whether
there are relevant circumstances that require adjustment or shifting of the
line in order to achieve an “equitable result.”84 Relevant circumstances,
among others, may include coastal configurations, like concavity,
presence of islands and relative length of coastlines.85
V. CONCLUSION
In many ways the Gulf of Maine Case speaks with a very general
voice. The Chamber of the International Court of Justice emphasized
that only general criteria and an open-ended list of practical methods
exist under present international law for guiding maritime boundary
delimitation.

83. Id.
84. For a review of the Jan Mayen, Qatar v. Bahrain, Eritrea/Yemen, and Cameron v.
Nigeria cases, see DAVID ANDERSON, MODERN LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS 403606 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). For territorial sea delimitation, the approach has
been similar with a provisional equidistant line subject to adjustment in light of special
circumstances. However, there still may be situations where a tribunal may not follow
the equidistant method, for example, when it is impossible to identify base points due to a
dynamic changing delta and coastline. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), October 8, 2007,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf.
85. For a further review of the methodology, see Stuart Kaye, Lessons Learned from
the Gulf of Maine Case: The Development of Maritime Boundary Delimitation
Jurisprudence Since UNCLOS III, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 73 (2008).
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Although the specific circumstances of each boundary dispute make
regional comparisons of limited use, the Gulf of Maine Case offers at
least six basic lessons that may be learned. Those lessons include: the
potential utility of resorting to binding dispute resolution and the ICJ
Chamber procedure; the flexibility open to countries in establishing the
parameters for binding dispute resolution; the linkability of binding
dispute resolution with other marine resource entitlement and
management issues; the possible variability of maritime boundary claims
over time; the divisibility of the line drawing task; and the advisability of
pursuing the “legal reductionism” inherent in adjudication.
Two additional lessons may also be learned in the wake of the case.
First is the continuity of transboundary ocean and coastal governance
challenges even after an ocean boundary is drawn. Second is the
evolutionary nature of maritime boundary delimitation methodology.
The two-part methodology of first drawing a provisional equidistant line
followed by possible adjustment in light of relevant circumstances
should be viewed as a positive development. The law is more
predictable although considerable uncertainties still surround what are
relevant criteria for deciding to shift the line.86 The learning process in
relation to maritime boundary delimitation is an ongoing saga.

86. Anderson, supra note 84, at 406.

